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REINVIGORATING THE PERCEIVED POTENTIAL COMPETITION THEORY: AN ANALYSIS OF 
THE POTENTIAL COMPETITION DOCTRINE AND FTC V. STERIS CORP. 
Henry S. Klimowicz* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Basic economic theory states that markets and consumers are usually best served when there 
is vigorous competition in a free market, with competitors battling over price and quality.  For this 
reason, antitrust law recognizes the preservation of competition as its primary goal.1  During the 
1960s and 1970s, 2 antitrust enforcement agencies responded to an increase in merger activity by 
challenging many transactions under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.3  The newly recognized potential 
competition doctrine was an effective legal tool upon which the agencies relied in non-horizontal 
merger cases before the Supreme Court.  It has been 43 years since the Supreme Court last ruled on 
a potential competition case, however, and their less-than-clear-precedent on the subject has led to 
lower courts crafting difficult and inconsistent standards.  In FTC v. Steris, a district court in Ohio 
recently rejected the government’s potential competition argument, finding that a merger between 
two of the largest firms in the already concentrated contract sterilization industry4 did not violate 
Section 7.  Despite being the only sub-theory under the potential competition doctrine endorsed by 
the Supreme Court, the FTC did not argue its case under the perceived potential competition theory.  
Instead, the decision hinged on a single element under the actual competition theory—a sub-theory 
with higher evidentiary burdens and no explicit Supreme Court approval.  Unsurprisingly, the court 
concluded that the FTC did not carry their evidentiary burden under the actual potential competition 
theory.   It is unclear why the FTC chose not to raise the perceived potential competition doctrine. If 
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. Gettysburg College.  I would like to thank Professor Marina 
Lao for the inspiration to write this Comment, and for her guidance throughout my research and writing of such.  I would 
also like to thank my parents, Doris and Bob Klimowicz, as well as my ciocia and uncle, Quiche and Richard Stone, for 
all of their unwavering love and support.  
1 Mission, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/atr/mission (last visited Apr. 10, 2018) (“The goal of the antitrust 
laws is to protect economic freedom and opportunity by promoting free and fair competition in the marketplace. 
Competition in a free market benefits American consumers through lower prices, better quality and greater choice. 
Competition provides businesses the opportunity to compete on price and quality, in an open market and on a level playing 
field, unhampered by anticompetitive restraints.  Competition also tests and hardens American companies at home, the 
better to succeed abroad.”). 
2 See generally, Thomas M. Hurley, The Urge to Merge: Contemporary Theories on the Rise of Conglomerate Mergers 
in the 1960s, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 185  (2006).  
3 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).  Section 7 of the Clayton Act deems a merger or acquisition unlawful if it may “substantially 
lessen competition.”  Id.  The Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice are the two main federal agencies 
who file antitrust challenges.   
4  The contract sterilization industry consists of companies that contract with manufacturers to rid their products of 
unwanted microorganisms. See FTC v. Steris Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 963-64 (N.D. Ohio 2015). 
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agencies continue to forgo this theory, however, the sustained allowance of non-horizontal mergers 
will pose new threats to US markets. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As industries become more concentrated, consumers are increasingly threatened by the 
prospect of monopolistic behavior due to the reduction of competition.5   Antitrust enforcement 
agencies seek to prevent this occurrence by prohibiting certain merger or acquisition transactions that 
may have this effect; however, these transactions can provide significant procompetitive benefits.6  
A merger, for instance, may benefit consumers and markets by augmenting innovation and 
efficiencies among the participating firms.7   But when these transactions occur in concentrated 
markets, they pose enhanced risks to competition.8  Congress addressed this concern long ago by 
passing the Clayton Act in 1914, as amended by the Celler-Kefauver Act in 1950.9  
Section 7 of the Clayton Act (Section 7) deems mergers and acquisitions unlawful where the 
effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”10  Congress 
conferred enforcement authority of Section 7 to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and 
Department of Justice (DOJ).11  Section 7 not only covers mergers between competitors in the same 
                                                 
5 See generally, Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin, & Roni Michaely, Are US Industries Becoming More Concentrated?, 
(August 31, 2017) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2612047 (“More than 75% of US industries have 
experienced an increase in concentration levels over the last two decade. . . .  In real terms, the average publicly-traded 
firm is three times larger today than it was twenty years ago.  Lax enforcement of antitrust regulations and increasing 
technological barriers to entry appear to be important factors behind this trend.  Overall, our findings suggest that the 
nature of US product markets has undergone a structural shift that has weakened competition.”).   
6  Competition Guidance for Antitrust Law, FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-
guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers (last visited Apr. 9, 2018). 
7  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §10, 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf (explaining the benefits that merger 
transactions can provide) (“Nevertheless, a primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their potential to generate 
significant economic efficiencies and thus enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, which may result 
in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or new products.”) [hereinafter 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES].  
8 Concentrated markets are harmful for competition and the DOJ recognizes this.  See 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra 
note 7, at 18–19.    
9 The original Clayton Act only prohibited the acquisition of “stock.”  15 U.S.C. §18.  The Celler-Kefauver Act amended 
the Clayton Act so it included horizontal mergers.  Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 1225. 
10 15 U.S.C. §18 
11 Todd N. Hutchison, Understanding the Differences Between the DOJ and FTC, A.B.A.: YOUNG LAW. DIVISION, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_series/understanding_differen
ces.html (“The DOJ and FTC share authority to enforce the Clayton Act and the Robinson-Patman Act.).  See 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 21, 25.  Each agency typically takes the lead in reviewing mergers within certain industries to enforce Section 7 of the 
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market (“horizontal” mergers), but also those effectuated by non-competitors in different markets 
(“non-horizontal” mergers).12  Historically, “potential competition” was a doctrine raised in cases 
involving non-horizontal mergers. 13  Today, it is also a concept that can be pertinent in horizontal 
mergers.14 
Antitrust enforcement agencies, the Supreme Court, and a handful of circuit courts have 
recognized the role that the potential competition doctrine plays in preserving competition. 15 
Agencies often seek to protect competition under the potential competition doctrine, in both the future 
and present, by respectively employing the actual potential competition theory and the perceived 
potential competition theory when arguing a non-horizontal merger case.16  
The Supreme Court, however, has only adopted the perceived potential competition theory. 
Still, the country’s highest judicial body has not made it easy for the FTC to succeed.  It has been 
over forty years since the Court has last ruled on such a case,17 and antitrust law has since shifted 
towards a more defendant-friendly agenda. 18  Consequently, lower courts have taken it upon 
themselves to craft different and often heightened standards under the doctrine. 19  This has 
                                                 
Clayton Act. Id. § 18.  Although there may be some overlap, the DOJ and FTC tend to allocate merger reviews according 
to their respective expertise.  For example, the DOJ typically investigates mergers in the Financial Services, 
Telecommunications, and Agricultural Industries; the FTC typically investigates mergers in the Defense, Pharmaceutical, 
and Retail Industries.  
12 Note that Non-Horizontal Mergers are now included within the same umbrella as “Horizontal Mergers” under the 
newest DOJ guidelines.  2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7. 
13  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1985) (separate 
designations between “non-horizontal” mergers and “horizontal mergers) [hereinafter 1985 GUIDELINES]; but see  
2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7 (where all mergers are viewed under the category of “horizontal mergers.”).  
14 See 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7. 
15 See generally, Ernest H. Schopler, “Doctrine of Potential Competition as Basis for Finding Violation of § 7 of Clayton 
Act,” (15 U.S.C.A. § 18), 44 A.L.R. Fed. 412. 
16 Id. at 2.  The actual potential competition doctrine seeks to prevent the removal future economic benefit, whereas the 
perceived potential competition doctrine seeks to preserve present economic benefits.  See also, 1985 GUIDELINES, supra 
note 13.   
17 The last Supreme Court ruling on a potential competition case was in United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 
418 U.S. 602 (1974).  
18 See generally, GELLOHRN, ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS, 453 (stating that antitrust enforcement agencies 
shifted to loose enforcement after the institution of the merger guidelines in the 1980’s).  
19 See Darren Bush & Salvatore Massa, Rethinking the Potential Competition Doctrine, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1035, 1058 
(2007) (“It is unsurprising then to find that lower courts have only contributed to the confusion in this area by creating a 
number of different and conflicting factors to evaluate claims that the acquisition of a potential competitor will violate 
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substantially detracted from the FTC’s ability to prioritize which types of firms deserve the title of 
“potential competitor.” 
This comment will first lay out the rationale and history underlying the potential competition 
doctrine. It will conclude by focusing on a recent lower court ruling in FTC. v. Steris Corporation in 
order to highlight the doctrine’s high evidentiary burdens. Thus, Part II will first attempt set forth a 
comprehensible explanation of the potential competition doctrine.  Part III will then address the 
Supreme Court cases on the doctrine and analyze the Court’s shift in standards under the perceived 
potential competition theory.  The latter portion of this argument will focus on the Steris decision, 
and argue that the FTC may have increased its chances of success had it relied on the perceived 
potential competition theory rather than the actual potential competition theory.  
II. THE POTENTIAL COMPETITION DOCTRINE: THE PERCEIVED POTENTIAL 
COMPETITION THEORY AND THE ACTUAL POTENTIAL COMPETITION THEORY 
 
A. The Potential Competition Doctrine, Generally. 
 
The Potential Competition Doctrine addresses mergers between non-competitors, which are 
commonly referred to as “non-horizontal mergers.”20  Although less susceptible to antitrust scrutiny 
than “horizontal mergers” (those between competitors),21 agencies still recognize the negative effects 
that non-horizontal mergers can pose on competition.22  Specifically, agencies address the future 
                                                 
section 7.  Worse still, in some cases, the courts appear to have disregarded what little guidance the Supreme Court has 
provided them.  And, many courts have become very skeptical of such claims entirely.”).  
20 Id. at 1081, n.355 (“In affirmative cases asserting the potential competitor doctrine, the 1984 Guidelines remain in 
force.  As the DOJ and FTC explained upon the release of the 1992 Guidelines: ‘guidance on non-horizontal mergers is 
provided in Section 4 of the Department’s 1984 Merger Guidelines, read in the context of today’s revisions to the 
treatment of horizontal mergers.’”) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice & FTC, Statement Accompanying Release of Revised 
Merger Guidelines (Apr. 2, 1992), reprinted in ABA Antitrust Section, The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: 
Commentary and Text 21, 22 (1992)). 
21 See Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines Sec. 4, Department of Justice (“Although non-horizontal mergers are less likely 
than horizontal mergers to create competitive problems, they are not invariably innocuous.”).  
22 1985 GUIDELINES, supra note 13 (“Non-horizontal mergers involve firms that do not operate in the same market.  It 
necessarily follows that such mergers produce no immediate change in the level of concentration in any relevant market 
. . . .  [N]on-horizontal mergers are less likely than horizontal mergers to create competitive problems . . . . In some 
circumstances, the non-horizontal merger of a firm already in a market with a potential entrant to that market may 
adversely affect competition.”).  
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effects a merger may have on competition by employing the actual potential competition theory.23  
Generally, this theory states that the transaction removes the possibility that the two firms would have 
competed within the same market in the future.24   When arguing a potential competition case, 
agencies often also seek to protect the present procompetitive effects a non-horizontal merger may 
threaten by employing the perceived potential competition theory.25  This theory states that a given 
transaction may remove present-procompetitive influences that the acquired firm has on the target 
market, which stems from the target market’s perceptions of the acquired firm’s ability to enter the 
target market.26  Thus, the sub-theories’ anticompetitive effects respectively stem from whether the 
acquired firm had an actual or perceived ability to enter the acquiring firm’s market.  
At first glance, these two theories may seem complex and intimidating—especially for those 
not familiar with antitrust law.27  In order to alleviate some of this confusion, this Comment will now 
further explain the basic rationale and frameworks underlying these two theories—and specifically, 
why their convoluted legal substance has broad implications for agencies when bringing a potential 
competition case.  
1. The Actual Potential Competition Theory: An Objective Standard 
Consider Outback Steakhouse (Outback), a business that largely competes with other sit-
down restaurants within the casual dining market.28 Outback thus resides on the edge of the drive-
                                                 
23 Bush & Mass, supra note 19, at 1046 (“The competitive effect from actual potential competition occurs in the future.”).  
24 Id.  
25 Id. (stating, “When the transaction or conduct is aimed at a potential competitor that is constraining market prices or 
having some other current, ongoing procompetitive effect, courts apply the perceived potential competition doctrine. For 
example, courts find that perceived potential competition is present when competitors in a highly concentrated market 
are aware of the potential competitor and have adjusted their pricing in a more competitive manner to perhaps deter that 
firm’s entry.”).  
26 Id.  See generally, William E. Dorigan: The Potential Competition Doctrine: The Justice Department’s Antitrust 
Weapon under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. (1975).  
27 Even for those who are familiar with antitrust law, the theory still tends to garner confusion.  See Bush & Massa, supra 
note 19, at 1089 (stating, “The language of the tests set out in the 1984 Guidelines and the 1992 Guidelines also creates 
some confusion . . . .”).  
28 See The Boulder Group, The Net Lease Casual Dining Market Report (Q1 2017), 
http://bouldergroup.com/media/pdf/2017-Q1-Net-Lease-Casual-Dining-Research-Report.pdf.pdf (listing financial 
statistics about Outback Steakhouse and other restaurants within the “casual dining market,” such as Hooters, Chili’s, 
and Red Lobster).  
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through fast-food market since their business models are in close proximity.29  Now, imagine that 
Outback is financially capable of expanding into the fast-food market, and is intent on doing so 
because of the high prices that fast-food restaurants charge.  Executives at McDonald’s recognize this 
probable expansion by Outback, and begin to fear that the move will detract from McDonald’s own 
sales by making its market more competitive.  In effort to avoid any future competition with Outback, 
McDonald’s takes the low-road initiative and successfully initiates a merger agreement with 
Outback.30  As a result, instead of having a new competitor in the fast-food market (which would 
likely pressure the fast-food giants to lower prices), the fast-food market ends up with a larger, more 
powerful McDonald’s—a firm that can continue to charge high prices. This example attempts to 
neatly portray why antitrust law and federal agencies have used the actual potential competition 
theory to challenge certain non-horizontal mergers that seem to remove the possibility of lower prices 
in the future.   
Now apply the previous hypothetical to a more formalized definition: the actual potential 
competition theory is premised on the notion that the acquired firm (Outback) may produce future 
procompetitive benefits in the acquiring firm’s market (drive through fast-food market) if it were not 
for the merger.31  In other words, the actual potential competition theory seeks to prevent non-
horizontal mergers, where transactions involve an acquired firm that is “likely” to soon enter the 
acquiring firm’s market.32   Thus, agencies use the actual potential competition theory to target 
                                                 
29  For purposes of this Comment, “close proximity” means that the two markets are somewhat similar.  “Market 
proximity,” however, is a legal term that attempts to portray the similarity of markets in objective terms. Joseph F. 
Brodley, The Potential Competition Doctrine Under the Merger Guidelines, 71 CAL. L. REV. 376, 389–401 (1983) 
(“Proximity is determined by: (1) the similarity between the two markets in terms of critical entry characteristics, such as 
production, marketing, technology, and transactional relations; and (2) actual observed entry between the two markets, 
or from the outside market into a market closely similar to the inside market. If according to these criteria the proximity 
between markets is close, it can be presumed that the acquiring firm has an entry advantage.”).  
30 Scienter on the part of McDonald’s is not required under the actual potential competition theory; however for the sake 
of this example, consider that such is present.   
31 See Donald F. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1313, 1362–86 
(1965).  This author actually endorses the actual competition theory, however, also discusses how many critique the 
theory as well.   
32 Id.  This may be done by either “de novo entry,” where a firm independently enters a market, or by “toe hold 
acquisition,” where a firm acquires a small firm in the market in order to gain entry.   
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transactions that involve acquired firms, which have the actual ability and intent to enter the market 
of the acquiring firm, prior to the merger.33  
These types of transactions raise red flags for antitrust agencies.  In their joint guidelines, the 
FTC and DOJ state: “By eliminating the possibility of entry by the acquiring firm in a more 
procompetitive manner, the merger could result in a lost opportunity for improvement in market 
performance resulting from the addition of a significant competitor.”34  
Make sense?  Well, in the context of Section 7, the Supreme Court is unsure.  The country’s 
highest judicial body has not adopted the theory35 and as a result, neither have all federal courts.36  
This widespread absence of approval is largely due to the commonly-held view that the theory is 
inconsistent with plain-reading interpretations of Section 7.37  Namely, critics claim that since the 
language of Section 7 prohibits only mergers that threaten to reduce present competition, the law 
should not bar mergers that take away the potential for increased competition in the future.38  Still, 
the theory has garnered lower court approval on account that enforcement agencies consistently raise 
it in the cases they bring.39  Therefore, many courts adjudicate actual potential competition issues, 40 
                                                 
33 Id.  
34 1985 GUIDELINES. 
35 See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974).  
36 The Eighth Circuit has approved of the doctrine, as have the Seventh and Tenth Circuits.  Other circuits, including the 
First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and District of Columbia have not decided the issue.  A number of lower courts have utilized 
the doctrine in hearing Section 7 challenges to mergers (2-10 Corporate Acquisitions and Mergers Sec. 10.02).  
37 On its face, Section 7 does not require a company to take the action most likely to make a market more competitive; 
Section 7 simply proscribes certain acts that may substantially decrease competition. Another objection to the actual 
potential competition theory is that if market forces are to be relied on to create consumer satisfaction, the presumption 
should be that the decision of a firm to enter a market by merger is the best and most efficient choice. See Corporate 
Acquisitions & Mergers.  See also Turner, supra note 31, at 1362–86.  
38  See, e.g., DOMINICK T. ARMENTANO, THE MYTHS OF ANTITRUST 235 (1972); Stanley D. Robinson, Recent 
Developments: 1974, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 243 (1975); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An 
Analysis of the Restricted Distribution Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 
323–24 (1975); but see, Donald F. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 
1313, 1383 (1965) (“[T]here is a rather modest case for prohibiting a merger between a firm that would clearly enter the 
market by internal expansion and a leading or growing established firm in a tight oligopoly.”) 
39 See FTC v. Steris Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 962 (N.D. Ohio 2015) (acknowledging that although the Supreme Court has 
not endorsed the actual potential competition doctrine, it will be accepted by the Court because the FTC recognizes its 
validity).  
40 E.g., id. 
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albeit in the absence of clear Supreme Court precedent.41 This is problematic for lower courts that 
adjudicate actual potential competition issues since these courts are seemingly free to develop their 
own standards without pushback.42  
The only potential guidance influencing lower court standards stems from statements the 
Supreme Court gave in dicta.43  In United States v. Marine Bancorporation, the Supreme Court stated 
that three essential preconditions must be met if an argument concerning the actual potential 
competition theory were to prevail: 
(i) The target market must be concentrated;  
(ii) The acquiring firm must have feasible means for entering the market 
other than by making the challenged acquisition, that is, by de novo entry or entry by 
foothold or toe hold acquisition;44  and 
(iii)  those means must offer a substantial likelihood of ultimately 
producing deconcentration of that market or other significant precompetitive 
effects.45 
Following the Court’s holding in Marine Bancorporation, many lower courts have still 
remained skeptical of the actual potential competition doctrine, since the Court ultimately failed to 
endorse the theory outright.46  Some of these lower courts, however, have heightened element two— 
the theory’s hallmark element—specifically, by requiring the FTC to show by “certain proof” that 
the acquired firm was likely to enter the acquiring firm’s market.47 
                                                 
41 The Supreme Court has addressed the actual potential competition doctrine, but just has not endorsed it.  See Marine 
Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602.  Therefore, the Supreme Court has not explicitly approved a framework or analysis for 
the actual potential competition doctrine.  
42 Bush & Mass, supra note 19.  
43 See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974).  
44 This is the element of issue in FTC v. Steris which will be discussed in Part V & VI.   
45 Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 633. 
46 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.  
47 See Federal Trade Com. v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 549 F.2d 289, 293–95 (4th Cir. 1977).  
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2. The Perceived Potential Competition Theory 
 
In the context of the Outback example, companies within the fast-food market are vigilant of 
other companies, like Outback, that reside on the edge of the drive-through fast-food industry.  It 
logically follows that McDonald’s, Wendy’s, and Burger King want to avoid potential competition 
with new fast-food chains.  In an effort to dissuade Outback from believing that its transition will be 
profitable, the fast-food chains will subsequently constrain the prices of their food.  Preserving this 
pre-emptive, procompetitive behavior of target market firms is the goal of agencies under the 
perceived potential competition theory.48 
The perceived potential competition theory recognizes that by simply residing “in the wings” 
of the fast-food industry, Outback can exert a present-procompetitive influence on the fast-food 
market without ever entering.49  Compared to the actual potential competition theory, the benefits on 
competition the perceived potential competition theory seeks to preserve may exist notwithstanding 
the possibility that (1) Outback may not actually intend on ever entering the fast-food market, or (2) 
Outback may not even be financially capable of entering the target market to begin with.50  Rather, 
the beneficial effect the theory seeks to preserve is dependent on (1) whether firms in the target market 
(McDonald’s, Wendy’s, and Burger King) subjectively perceive Outback as a company that may 
enter, and (2) if that perception has a present-procompetitive effect on their behavior in the form of 
lower prices.51  
                                                 
48 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.  
49 See Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. at 625. 
50 See Bush & Massa, supra note 19, at 1046 (“[C]ourts find that perceived potential competition is present when 
competitors in a highly concentrated market are aware of the potential competitor and have adjusted their pricing in a 
more competitive manner to perhaps deter that firm’s entry.”).  
51 Id.  
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Courts refer to this effect as “the wings effect,”52 “the fringe effect,” and “the edge effect.”53  
But unlike the actual potential competition doctrine, the Supreme Court has endorsed the perceived 
potential competition doctrine as a valid legal principle.54  Still, however, few courts have barred 
mergers on perceived potential competition grounds.55   
The 1985 Merger Guidelines include a more formalized explanation of the theory’s 
underlying rationale, in addition to the potential anticompetitive effects of such a merger:  
By eliminating a significant present competitive threat that constrains the behavior of 
the firms already in the market, the merger could result in an immediate deterioration 
in market performance.  The Economic theory of limit pricing suggests that 
monopolists and groups of colluding firms may find it profitable to restrain their 
pricing in order to deter new entry.56  
 
Under the Marine Bancorporation framework, to successfully invoke the perceived potential 
competition doctrine, the FTC must show that: (i) the acquired firm has the “characteristics, 
capabilities, and economic incentives to render it a perceived potential entrant de novo; (ii) the target 
market is substantially concentrated; and (iii) the acquired firm’s premerger presence on the fringe 
of the target market in fact tempted oligopolistic behavior of firms operating in that market.57 A 
fourth prerequisite, given in a later Supreme Court case, requires that there are few other potential 
entrants.58  
                                                 
52 Id. 
53 See United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976). 
54 See United States v. El Paso 376 U.S. 651 (1964). 
55 See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 
1972), United States v. First Nat’l State Bancorporation, 499 F. Supp. 793 (D.N.J. 1980); United States v. Phillips 
Petroleum Corp., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1234; 1254–56 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff’d mem. sub nom.  Tidewater Oil Co. v. United 
States, 418 U.S. 906 (1974), reh’g denied, 419 U.S. 886 (1974); In re Brunswick Corp., 94 F.T.C. 1174, 1273 
(1979), aff’d sub nom.  Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981); In re Polypore Int’l, Inc., 2010 FTC 
LEXIS 97, at *72 n.41 (2010), concurring opinion at 2010 FTC LEXIS 96 (2010), aff’d, 686 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2853 (U.S. 2013). 
56 See 1985 GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at [page].  The theory of perceived potential competition relies on the general 
notion that firms in existing markets wish to avoid competition, and are pressured to keep their prices low by firms they 
perceive as potential entrants. The preservation of this present competitive benefit is the underlying goal of the perceived 
potential competition doctrine.   
57 See Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. at 624-25.  
58 See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 534 n.13 (1973).  This requirement is usually bundled with 
element three, because if there are many potential entrants, the perceptions of the acquired firm, specifically, will likely 
not have much of an effect on the target market.  
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III. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AND THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE PERCEIVED POTENTIAL 
COMPETITION DOCTRINE 
 
The potential competition doctrine was first recognized as a legitimate legal tool for antitrust 
enforcement in 1964 with the Supreme Court’s rulings in United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. 
and United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co.59  The historical milieu surrounding antitrust law during 
this period is significant in that mostly all of the following cases were adjudicated during the 1960s 
and 1970s—a period marked by enhanced merger activity. 60   Recognizing a spike in merger 
transactions, antitrust enforcement agencies adopted aggressive anti-merger policies.61  The rationale 
applied by the Court in the following two cases therefore portrays an economic perspective that 
presumed harm to competition when faced with transactions occurring in concentrated markets.62  
Today, however, enforcement policies are reluctant to make such an assumption as the legal 
landscape surrounding mergers is more defendant-friendly.63  
United States v. El Paso was the first Supreme Court case to address the perceived potential 
competition theory.64  In El Paso, the merging firms were both large players who sold gas in different 
Northwest states.65  The acquiring firm, El Paso Natural Gas Co. (El Paso), was the only out-of-state 
supplier in California.66  El Paso agreed to acquire Pacific Northwest Pipeline (Pacific) after Pacific’s 
                                                 
59 United States v. El Paso 376 U.S. 651 (1964); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).  
60 See supra note 2. 
61 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION, The Development of Antitrust Enforcement, http://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-
rights-in-action/bria-23-1-c-the-development-of-antitrust-enforcement.html. 
62 See “Detecting and Reversing The Decline in Horizontal Merger Enforcement,” Baker & Shapiro (2008) (arguing that 
merger enforcement during this time was overly stringent due to inflexible standards which relied on the “structural 
presumption” of harm to competition from increasing market concentration) 
63 See generally, GELLOHRN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS, 453 (discussing the shift to loose enforcement after the 
institution of the merger guidelines in the 1980s).  
64 El Paso, 376 U.S. at 655.   
65 Id. at 653. 
66 Id. at 652 & n.2. (stating that El Paso also supplied fifty percent of the state’s natural gas).  
 13 
tentative plan to deliver oil in this state was terminated.67  Prior to the merger, Pacific Northwest was 
eager to enter the California market but had not yet proven successful.68  
The Supreme Court barred the acquisition on potential competition grounds, but the opinion 
did not explicitly mention the potential competition doctrine by name.69  Still, the Court accepted the 
DOJ’s argument that the merger was capable of substantially lessening competition since Pacific was 
a “potential supplier” to the California market.70  The Court established a vague test for determining 
whether the transaction harmed competition, stating that that “[t]he effect on competition in a 
particular market through [the] acquisition of another company is determined by the nature or extent 
of that market and by the nearness of the absorbed company to it, that company’s eagerness to enter 
that market, its resourcefulness, and so on.”71   
Applying this test, the Court determined that Pacific Northwest was a potential competitor 
that had a present-procompetitive effect on the California market.72  Although not yet within the 
California market, the Court determined that Pacific was a potential entrant since El Paso was the 
only out-of-state supplier to California, and because Pacific Northwest was “the only other important 
interstate pipeline west of the Rocky Mountains.”73 
In its reasoning, the Court foreshadowed the driving principles behind the perceived potential 
competition theory. The Court emphasized that the purpose of Section 7 was “to arrest the trend 
toward concentration, the tendency to monopoly, before the consumer's alternatives disappeared 
through merger . . . .”74  The Court also noted that the natural gas industry was extremely regulated 
                                                 
67 Id. at 655. 
68 Id.  
69 Id. at 659.  The Court did refer to Northwest as a “potential competitor” once, but did not generally speak of the potential 
competition doctrine as an established rule of law.  
70 El Paso, 367 U.S. at 661. 
71 Id. at 660.  Because of the Court’s “and so on” inclusion, its list of factors is not exhaustive.  This allowed the possibility 
of more factors to be considered in later cases.  
72 Id.  
73 Id. 658–59.  The Court noted that this was evident after Pacific Northwest lost a bid to enter the California market after 
El Paso subsequently made significant financial concessions to prevail.   
74 Id. (quoting United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. at 367 (1963)).  
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at the time, meaning that there were high barriers of entry for new entrants.75  The Court concluded 
its opinion by stating: “We would have to wear blinders not to see that the mere efforts of Pacific 
Northwest to get into the California market, though unsuccessful, had a powerful influence on El 
Paso’s business attitudes within the State.”76  Thus, the most influential aspect was the fact that 
Pacific Northwest had regularly attempted to enter the California market through the submission of 
bids, which had a consequential effect on El Paso’s business decisions—notwithstanding the fact that 
none of Pacific Northwest’s bids were successful.77   
In United States v. Penn-Olin, the Court expanded the applicability of the potential 
competition doctrine.78  Prior to the joint venture, Pennsalt Chemicals Corporation, (Pennsalt) had 
not yet distributed its sodium-chlorate product in a growing south eastern market.79  Olin Mathieson 
Chemicals Corporation (Olin), a producer of similar chemicals, agreed to serve as a distributor for 
Pennsalt’s product in the south eastern market after the companies formed a joint venture.80  There 
had been no entry into this heavily concentrated market in over a decade, but each company had 
independently considered entering prior to their agreement.81  
The Supreme Court held that the lower court erred in applying the potential competition 
doctrine by only considering, “as a matter of probability [whether] both companies would have 
                                                 
75 Id. 659–60.  High entry barriers are conditions that make it difficult for companies to enter a given market, making 
their existence a concern for antitrust enforcement agencies. See John B. Kirkwood & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., The Path to 
Profitability: Reinvigorating the Neglected Phase of Merger Analysis, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 39 (2009) (discussing 
agencies’ use of “entry barriers” and varying definitions.) 
76 El Paso, 367 U.S. at 651. 
77 This case is viewed by scholars to concern perceived potential competition.  See Bush & Massa, supra note 19, at 104–
49.  The Court, however, alludes to the notion to that Pacific Northwest was an “actual competitor” through its attempts 
to enter by bidding, stating that “unsuccessful bidders are no less competitors than successful ones.  Id. at 1049. 
78 78 U.S. 158 (1964).  See Bush & Massa, supra note 19, at 1050 (“The Penn-Olin case also represented a distinct 
expansion of the doctrine.  In El Paso, the potential entrant’s effect on the market was through an unsuccessful bid.  In 
contrast, Penn-Olin involved a joint venture to produce and sell sodium chlorate between two firms: one firm never served 
the geographic market that the joint venture would serve; the other never produced the chemical that was the relevant 
product.”).  
79 Penn-Olin, 78 U.S. at 161–62. 
80 Including the joint venture, the market consisted of only three firms.  Id. at 163.  
81 Id. at 164–66. 
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entered the market as individual competitors if Penn-Olin had not been formed.”82  The Supreme 
Court held that the district court should have analyzed the precise effect that the other firm would 
have had on the market if only one of them had entered.83  In other words, the Court noted that the 
district court should have gauged whether there would have been a wings effect if only one of the 
companies had decided to enter the south eastern market.  Realizing that this effect was too difficult 
to gauge, the Court concluded that the agreement did not violate Section 7.84  The Court, however, 
still determined that both companies could be considered potential competitors.85  This conclusion 
was based on the companies’ resources, their diverse product lines, their compelling reasons to enter 
the market, their respectable reputations, and their “know-how” as established companies of how to 
effectively enter a new market.86  
The Court’s decision in Penn-Olin is important when considering the type of firm that might 
pose the most anticompetitive risks when analyzing the perceived potential competition theory.87  
Specifically, the Court stated: “the existence of an aggressive, well-equipped and well financed 
corporation engaged in the same or related lines of commerce waiting anxiously to enter an 
oligopolistic market would be substantial incentive to competition which cannot be 
underestimated.”88  
The previous cases both recognize an important proposition under the perceived potential 
competition theory.  Namely, that (1) courts should endeavor to gauge the effects a potential 
competitor has by residing on the wings of a given market, and (2) a showing of the acquiring firm’s 
intent to enter the market of the acquired firm is extremely relevant when gauging if the perceived 
                                                 
82 Id. at 172–73. 
83 Id. 181–82.  
84 This was because the Court found that gauging the precise competitive effects in this instance was “impossible to 
demonstrate.”  Id. at 176.  But see  United States v. El Paso 376 U.S. 651, 659 (1964)  (where the court was able to directly 
show such through El Paso having lowered its prices in response to Pacific Northwest’s bid attempts).  
85 Penn-Olin, 78 U.S. at 175 
86 Id.  
87 Id. at 174. 
88 Id.  
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potential competition theory should apply.89  The Court’s holding a few years later demonstrates why 
actual intent of acquired firms is not dispositive when determining whether present procompetitive 
benefits exist.  
In FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., the Supreme Court ultimately barred Procter & Gamble’s 
(Procter) acquisition of Clorox on perceived potential competition grounds.90  Procter was a producer 
and distributor of a wide variety of household cleaning items, which did not include bleach, prior to 
the proposed acquisition.91  Clorox, the acquired firm, was an exclusive manufacturer of bleach and 
controlled fifty percent of an extremely concentrated industry.92 
 The lower court found that Procter was not a potential competitor since it had no intent, nor 
had made any past attempt to enter the bleach market.93  The Supreme Court reversed, finding that 
Procter was a potential competitor in the liquid bleach market despite its finding that Procter had not 
evidenced any intent to enter. 94   The Court made this conclusion based largely on Procter’s 
advantageous positioning in the adjacent, household cleaning-product market.95  Probative to the 
Court’s finding that Procter was the “most likely entrant” to the liquid bleach market were the facts 
that Procter sold similar goods, was engaged in a program to diversify its product lines, had 
substantial advantages in advertisement and merchandising, retained experienced managers who 
marketed similar goods, and could feasibly build an efficient plant at a reasonable cost.96  The Court 
                                                 
89 This inquiry is even more relevant when showing actual potential competition, or the future anticompetitive effects that 
a transaction may have.  This is because under the actual potential competition theory, the main inquiry is whether the 
acquired firm is going to enter the market.  To reiterate, an “anticompetitive effect” in this context is the removal of a 
firm that would likely enter the target market as an “actual competitor.”   
90 386 U.S. 568 (1967).  
91 Id. at 572. 
92 Id. at 570–71. 
93 Id. at 580. 
94 See id.  
95 Id.  
96 Id.  
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also found that Procter had acquired Clorox for the purpose of gaining a greater share of the market 
than it could have attained had it entered independently.97   
The Court also placed heightened importance on the plethora of potential anticompetitive 
effects the merger could have had if effectuated.  It stated that (1) removing Procter from the market 
would eradicate the present procompetitive effects that Procter had on the liquid bleach market by 
waiting in the wings,98 and (2) that the acquisition would deter new entry among smaller firms 
considering entering the liquid bleach market since they would not want to compete with the larger, 
newly merged Procter.99  
Six years later, the Supreme Court gave a more complete analysis of the perceived potential 
competition doctrine, in United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.100  In Falstaff, the United States 
challenged a merger between Falstaff Brewing Company and Narragansett Brewing Company.101  
Prior to the merger, Falstaff was one of the ten largest brewing companies in the United States.102  
Falstaff had not sold its products in the New England market prior to the merger, but publicly 
expressed interest in doing so on multiple occasions.103  Instead of eventually entering de novo, 
however, Falstaff decided to purchase Narragansett—a company that held a twenty percent share of 
the New England market.104  
                                                 
97 386 U.S. at 581. 
98 Id. at 581.  The Court determined that Procter, in fact, had an effect on the market behavior of participants in the liquid 
bleach industry since it viewed Procter as one that might begin producing bleach.  The Court, however, did not gauge the 
price effect that would arise from the elimination of Procter as a perceived potential entrant.   Id.; see also United States 
v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co.78 U.S. 158 (1964) (finding that doing so was impossible).  
99 386 U.S. at 581; see Bush & Massa, supra note 19, at 1053 (stating the acquisition might discourage smaller firms 
considering entering the market, or already on the fringe).  In stating that “few firms would have the temerity to challenge 
a firm as solidly entrenched as Clorox,” the Court suggested that smaller firms will have even fewer incentives to enter a 
market dominated by an established incumbent (Clorox) that is owned by a large conglomerate with significant resources 
(Procter).  Thus, the Court reasoned that the transaction would create, or increase, barriers to entry in the bleach market 
for smaller firms, perhaps significantly limiting the number of perceived potential entrants to only larger firms.  See 386 
U.S. at 578.  
100 United States v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 410 U.S. 526 (1973).  
101 Id.  
102 Id. at 551. 
103 Id.  
104 Id. at 528 (stating that this twenty percent market share was expected to increase).  
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The government employed the potential competition doctrine and argued that the transaction 
may substantially lessen competition in the New England market because: (1) Falstaff was a 
“potential entrant” and (2) the acquisition eliminated competition that would have existed had Falstaff 
entered the market de novo. 105   The district court rejected this contention and permitted the 
transaction, reasoning that Falstaff could not successfully enter the New England market de novo or 
through a toe-hold acquisition; it had to be by the acquisition of a larger brewery already in the region, 
such as Narragansett.106  
In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court did not rely on the finding that Falstaff lacked 
the actual capability of successfully entering the market on its own.  Rather, the Court reinforced its 
holding in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., and stated that the district court had, “failed to give separate 
consideration to whether Falstaff was a potential competitor in the sense that it was so positioned on 
the edge of the market that it exerted beneficial influence on competitive conditions in that market.”107  
Specifically, the Supreme Court insisted that such an inquiry should be centered not on the internal 
decisions of Falstaff executives, but on whether, “given its financial capabilities and conditions in the 
New England market, it would be reasonable to consider [Falstaff] a potential entrant into that 
market.”108  The Court ultimately remanded the decision to the lower court to determine whether 
Falstaff could be said to influence existing competition as a potential competitor on the fringe of a 
market.109  
Considering that the lower court already found that Falstaff was incapable of entering 
independently,110 this case shows the importance the Supreme Court gives to showings of a wings 
                                                 
105 Id. at 529.  Note that not all acquisitions raise Section 7 concerns.  For instance, if Falstaff decided to purchase a 
company that held a smaller percentage of the New England market than Narragansett, it is probable that such a 
transaction would not raise the same level of antitrust concerns.  
106 Falstaff, 410 U.S. at 530.  
107 Id. at 533. 
108 Id.  
109 Id. at 534.  
110 Id. at 533.  
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effect when posed with arguments under perceived potential competition theory.  Thus, in both 
Falstaff and Procter, the Court did not narrowly focus on whether a firm is likely to enter a market 
but for the merger.  Instead, in both cases, the Court corrects the lower courts for their failure to 
consider whether the firm in question had a present procompetitive influence on the target market.111  
In the following case, however, the Court shifts its position under the perceived potential competition 
theory, and proffers heightened standards under both of the potential competition doctrine’s sub-
theories.112  
In Marine Bancorporation, the United States challenged a proposed merger between two 
commercial banks.113  The Court ultimately prohibited the acquiring firm from engaging in a market 
it decided not to enter de novo.114  The acquiring bank, National Bank of Commerce (NBC), was a 
large bank based in Seattle and owned a subsidiary of the appellee, Marine Bancorporation.115  This 
firm was the second largest bank in the state, but had not yet been able to compete directly in the 
Spokane metropolitan area.116  The acquired firm, Washington Trust Bank (WTB), was a smaller 
bank in Spokane.117 
The government argued that the proposed merger violated Section 7, and argued its case under 
both sub-theories.118   Under the actual potential competition theory, the government first argued that 
the merger would eliminate the possibility of market deconcentration in the future since NBC could 
enter the Spokane market without a merger.119  Under the perceived potential competition doctrine, 
                                                 
111 Falstaff, 410 U.S. 526; Procter, 386 U.S. 568. 
112 United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974). 
113 Id.  
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 606.  
116 Id. at 606–07.  
117 Id. at 607 (explaining that WTB controlled the third largest percentage of total deposits in the Spokane region). 
118 Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. at 614–15. 
119 Id. 
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the government argued that NBC’s perceived presence on the fringe of the Spokane market had 
present procompetitive effects.120  
Without endorsing the actual potential competition theory,121 the Court stated in dicta that if 
the government were to succeed under this theory, “two essential preconditions must be met[:] . . . (i) 
that in fact NBC has available feasible means for entering the Spokane market other than by acquiring 
WTB; and (ii) that those means offer a substantial likelihood of ultimately producing deconcentration 
of that market or other significant procompetitive effects.”122  Under the first prong, the Court found 
that state law barriers precluded NBC from establishing a branch bank in Spokane de novo,123 and 
concluded that that the only means that NBC could enter the target market was through merger.124 
Under the second prong, the Court acknowledged that it is conceivable under state law that NBC may 
have been able to acquire smaller banks within Spokane but determined that state law limitations on 
NBC’s ability to grow those entities rendered any likely procompetitive effects de minimis.125   
Since the Court also rejected the government’s perceived potential competition argument,126 
the Marine Bancorporation case further highlights the high evidentiary burdens that the FTC faces 
when arguing potential competition cases.  The government attempted to show that NBC was a 
perceived potential entrant that exerted present-procompetitive effects on the Spokane market by 
offering subjective evidence in the form of a memorandum written by an NBC officer.127  The Court, 
however, dismissed this evidence by stating that the opinions of officers of the acquiring bank, and 
                                                 
120 Id.  The government also proffered a third argument, stating that WTB as an independent entity would develop by 
internal expansion or mergers with other medium-size banks into a regional or ultimately state-wide actual competitor of 
NBC and other large banks.  Cite.  
121 Id. at 639 (stating that the Court “express[es] no view on the appropriate resolution of the question reserved in Falstaff 
regarding the viability and means to resolve the actual potential competition theory.”).  
122 Id. at 633. 
123 Id. at 629. 
124 Id. at 630.  
125 Marine Bancorporation, Inc. 418 U.S. at 638. 
126 Id. at 639-40. 
127 Id. at 640.  The note stated, “Spokane banks were likely to engage in price competition as NBC approached their 
market.”  Id.   
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not the target bank, did not establish a violation of Section 7.128  The Court instead applied an 
objective standard when gauging fringe effect, and stated that since “rational bankers” in Spokane 
were aware of the regulatory barriers that rendered NBC an unlikely or insignificant entrant except 
by merger, “[i]t is improbable that NBC exerts any meaningful procompetitive influence over 
Spokane banks by ‘standing in the wings.’” 129   After an economic review of the market and 
concluding that no fringe effect was evident, the Court used objective evidence pertaining to entry 
barriers in order to make a subjective determination concerning firm perception.130  
IV. THE PERCEIVED POTENTIAL COMPETITION THEORY POST-MARINE BANCORPORATION: A 
SUBJECTIVE STANDARD?  
Admittedly, the FTC’s case in Marine Bancorporation was not strong.  The agency was not 
able to proffer any legitimate subjective evidence which neatly showed target firm perception, nor 
was it able to objectively show, through economic data, that NBC had a fringe effect on banks in 
Spokane.131  Still, however, the Marine Bancorporation case is important in the Court’s focus away 
from the future anticompetitive effects of a merger, like in Procter and Falstaff.132  Ultimately, 
however, the Court’s use of an objective standard when gauging fringe effect undermines any 
incentive to use the perceived potential competition doctrine. 
Thus, Marine Bancorporation essentially requires that acquired firms, such as Outback in the 
prior hypothetical, be actually capable of entering the acquiring firm’s market, regardless of whether 
the company is already exerting procompetitive influences, or whether the target market is overly 
concentrated.  This standard is puzzling, in that the present-procompetitive effects—the focus of the 
                                                 
128 Id.  
129 Id. at 639–40.  
130 Id.  
131 Marine Bancorporation, Inc. 418 U.S. at 640–41. 
132 See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); see also United States v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 410 U.S. 526 
(1973). 
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perceived potential competition doctrine—stem from subjective perceptions rather than actual 
capabilities.  
The objective standard the Court gives in Marine Bancorporation essentially equates the 
perceived potential competition theory to the actual potential competition theory by requiring that 
the acquired firm actually be able to enter. 133   This issue is ultimately most noticeable when 
considering the following case: where evidence shows that the target market perceives the acquired 
firm as a perceived potential entrant, but where objective evidence of such perception (i.e., through 
economic data concerning fringe effect) cannot be tied to those perceptions.  This risks the possibility 
that any present-procompetitive effects an acquired firm has on a target market will not be fleshed 
out and confirmed through objective evidence, despite overwhelming subjective evidence that 
evinces the contrary.   
Naturally, lower courts have struggled in creating consistent standards for determining 
whether a  “wings effect” exists.134  The Supreme Court in Marine Bancorporation appeared to 
require direct evidence of such.135  Lower courts, however, most namely those in the Second Circuit, 
are more lenient.136  The Second Circuit requires only “at least circumstantial evidence” that the 
fringe presence “probably directly affected competitive activity in the market,” and does not compel 
plaintiffs to proffer any direct evidence of procompetitive effects in the form of direct economic 
data.137   Other lower courts have even assumed that a fringe effect exists based on a showing of 
certain objective factors.138 Again, the Second Circuit’s more lenient standard under this analysis is 
                                                 
133 See supra, note 31.  
134 Id. at 640.  
135 United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 625 (1974) (“[T]he acquiring firms premerger presence 
on the fringe of the target market must have in fact tempered oligopolistic behavior.”).  
136 Tenneco, 689 F.2d at 358.  
137 Id.   
138 United States v. Phillips Petroleum, 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1230 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (“The objective evidence of record 
concerning Phillips’ capacity and motivation to enter the market unilaterally, Phillips’ status as the most likely potential 
entrant, the small number of other potential entrants, the feasibility of unilateral entry by Phillips, and the concentrated 
nature of the market are legally sufficient to establish that Phillips’ entry into the market through the Tidewater acquisition 
had substantial anticompetitive effects.  It must necessarily be assumed that the entry of an aggressive major company 
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more conducive to preserving the economic benefits that may be had under the perceived potential 
competition theory.  
 In order to understand why the objective Marine Bancorporation standard seems inconsistent 
with the basic premise of the perceived potential competition doctrine, consider the case of scare 
crows. Similar to how these human-shaped objects can deceive birds from eating crops—despite 
being unable to actually harm those birds—acquired firms can deter target-market firms from raising 
prices despite not actually being able to enter the market.  Thus, simply because an acquired firm is 
not capable of entering a market does not mean it does not provide a valuable benefit worth 
preserving—just like how a scarecrow is worth having although it may not actually be able to inflict 
harm on birds.  Proponents of the Marine Bancorporation standard may say that target-market 
participants are not as naive as birds, and that the former have perfect perceptions regarding the 
financial capabilities and intent of acquired firms residing “on the wings.” The FTC and DOJ have 
their doubts as to if this is true, however.139  But if that is the case, then a subjective standard can 
only incentivize those firms to do their research to ensure that they have every piece of necessary 
information.  
This anomaly underlies the difficulties courts have with this doctrine. Thus, prior to Marine 
Bancorporation, the Supreme Court recognized the notion that firms do not always set prices in 
accordance to what the “rational” market participant knows about potential entrants, by giving 
weight to subjective evidence under the perceived potential competition theory. 140  In Marine 
Bancorporation, the Court objectified this analysis, assuming they do.141  The FTC states, however, 
                                                 
such as Phillips into such a market on a unilateral basis would have conferred substantial competitive benefits which were 
lost when it was allowed to step into the shoes of an established major factor in the market.  The substantiality of the 
anticompetitive effects of the Tidewater acquisition may be inferred from the objective facts present here.”).  
139 1985 GUIDELINES, supra note 13. 
140 Falstaff, 410 U.S. at 536 (Falstaff had, in press releases and company publications, expressed an interest in distributing 
its product nationally; the Supreme Court stated that these pre-acquisition discussions were relevant in concluding 
whether Falstaff was a perceived potential entrant). 
141 Marine Bancorporation, Inc. 418 U.S. at 639–40.  
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that firms may have misjudged perceptions about potential entrants.142 So why would the Court 
impose a test that assumes they have perfect knowledge? If these target market firms are adjusting 
prices in accordance to these misguided perceptions, beneficial effects may exist.  Given antirust 
law’s desire to keep markets competitive and prices low, we should not disrupt target market firm’s 
misperceptions about potential entrants who are not actually capable of entering. In essence, an 
objective standard presumes that scare crows are only useful if they are actually capable of harming 
the birds that may enter a field of crops. Thus, Marine Bancorporations objective standard, which 
require that acquired firms actually be capable of entering the target market, are not warranted—just 
like robotic scare crows capable of injuring daring birds are not needed to preserve crops.  
Lower courts have consequently struggled with the objective standard, that is, determining 
whether an acquired firm has the “characteristics, capabilities and economic incentives to render it a 
perceived potential entrant de novo.”  This confusion has resulted in different standards across 
circuits.143  Straying away from the heightened Marine Bancorporation standard, lower courts have 
given varied degrees of weight to subjective perceptions.  This evidence often comes in the form of 
testimony from executive officials within the target market regarding their perceptions of the 
acquired firm, specifically, to see whether they believe the acquired firm is one they think may enter 
the target market.144  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Tenneco v. FTC found the acquired 
firm to be a “perceived potential competitor” under element (i) by largely relying on the subjective 
perceptions of target market participants, notwithstanding a lack of evidence which showed the 
acquired firm had many of the “characteristics, capabilities, or incentives” the framework seems to 
                                                 
142 1985 GUIDELINES, supra note 13 (stating that target-market “firms may misjudge the entry advantages of a particular 
firm).  
143 See Bush & Massa, supra note 19, at 1058.  
144 See, e.g., Tenneco, Inc. v. FTC, 689 F.2d 346, 355 (2d Cir. 1982) (considering testimony by industry executives as to 
whether they considered Tenneco a potential entrant admitted along with evidence of negotiations, Tenneco’s financial 
strength, and compatibility of products of the acquiring and acquired firm); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 
67, 76–78 (10th Cir. 1972) (upholding FTC finding that Kennecott was a perceived potential entrant based on testimony 
of competitors and evidence about the company’s ability to enter the market).  
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require.145 Given the difficulty in gauging a “wings effect,”146 subjective standards of this type are 
more desirable if agencies wish to preserve any economic benefits from firm perception which may 
be had.    
The objective standard under Marine Bancorporation, however, may speak more to a method 
of proving proximate causation, rather than an unwarranted standard which only serves as a hurdle 
for the FTC.  Other courts, therefore, understandably require certain amounts of objective evidence, 
no matter how strong the subjective evidence alludes to that fact that incumbent firms perceive the 
acquired firm to be a potential entrant.147  
Thus, it is argued that the perceived potential competition theory should not rest on whether 
the acquired firm is actually a “potential competitor.”  Rather, similar to the Second Circuit’s 
approach, the focus should center on whether the acquired firm is perceived by firms in the target 
market as being a “perceived potential entrant.”148  Thus, whether the acquired firm actually intends 
to enter the target market should not be controlling like it is under the actual potential competition 
theory for the reasons stated above.149  That being said, actual intent (e.g., public statements by the 
acquired company pre-merger) to enter a market may still be relevant in deciding whether companies 
in the target market are changing their behavior in response. 
 
                                                 
145 Tenneco, 689 F. 2d 346 at 353–56 (finding that the defendant could be considered a perceived potential entrant because 
incumbent firms were not aware of its lack of success in past attempts of entering market).  See also Ginsburg v. InBev, 
649 F. Supp. 2d 943, 948–50 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (where the district court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on 
the pleadings finding that InBev was not a perceived potential entrant based on evidence that it had actively withdrawn 
from the United States market and had entered into a long-term exclusive distribution agreement by which its products 
were imported into and distributed within the United States), aff’d on other grounds, 623 F.3d 1229 (8th Cir. 2010). 
146 See Bush & Massa, supra note 19. 
147 E.g., Mo. Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 863 (2d Cir. 1974).  
148 A “perceived potential entrant” is a firm that is viewed by firms in the target market as one that may enter the target 
market.   
149 Whether a firm intends to enter the market of the acquiring firm may not influence the subjective perceptions of the 
firms in the target market.  This element, however, is still relevant in determining, objectively, whether rational firms in 
the target market view it as a perceived potential entrant.  
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V. ANALYZING THE FTC V. STERIS CORPORATION RULING IN THE FACE OF MARINE 
BANCORPORATION  
This Comment now turns to an analysis of FTC v. Steris Corp. to review the court’s analysis of 
the potential competition doctrine.150  Part V will first present the facts of the case.  Then, it will argue 
that the FTC erred by not raising the perceived potential competition theory even in light of the 
Marine Bancorporation standard.  The Comment will then argue that the perceived potential 
competition doctrine should be adjusted in accordance with prior precedent given the result in Steris.  
A. Facts  
 
In 2015, the FTC sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against 
Steris Corp. (Steris) for its proposed merger with another leading sterilization provider, Synergy 
Health PLC (Synergy).151  Steris and Synergy were the second and third largest firms in the contract 
sterilization service market, which consisted of companies that contracted with manufacturers to rid 
their products of unwanted microorganisms.152  Sterigenics Corp. (Sterigenics), a third party not 
involved in the proposed merger, was the largest firm by size and revenue in the relevant market.153 
 At the time of the merger, the US sterilization market consisted of three methods of 
sterilization: gamma radiation, e-beam radiation, and “EO” Radiation.154  Although Synergy was the 
largest provider of EO facilities in the United States, it did not have any competitive presence in the 
US market prior to the merger for gamma radiation services, which was the most well-regarded 
method of sterilization.155   Steris and Sterigenics held eighty-five percent of US gamma facilities and 
                                                 
150 FTC v. Steris Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 962 (N.D. Ohio 2015).  
151 Id.   
152 Id. at 963–64. 
153 Id. at 963. 
154 Id. at 964. Customers, however, may choose sterilization methods based on their products’ physical characteristics. 
Id.  
155 Id. (“Gamma sterilization . . . is the most effective and economical option for most healthcare products because of its 
penetration capabilities.  It is the only viable option for dense products (e.g., implantable medical devices) and products 
packaged in larger quantities.”).  Synergy did use Gamma Radiation; however, all of its facilities were located overseas.   
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a bulk of the US market share.156  This fact compelled Synergy founder, Dr. Richard M. Steeves, to 
develop a plan which could assist Synergy in attracting gamma-using customers within the US.157  
Steeves identified what he believed was an “industry trend” of companies switching from gamma to 
x-ray sterilization services after a major product manufacturer engaged in this switch. 158   This 
motivated Steeves to purchase Daniken Corp., a Swiss x-ray sterilization provider.159  Steeves made 
the purchase with the ultimate goal of implementing commercialized x-ray sterilization in the US 
market, which, according to the FTC, was a viable alternative to gamma radiation for its “possibly 
superior depth of penetration and turnaround times.”160  
Following the purchase of Daniken, Steeves presented his plan to the Board of Directors in 
2012.161  Steeves recognized numerous issues Synergy needed to overcome for x-ray sterilization to 
be successfully implemented in the United States, which consisted of: (1) building facilities within 
the United States at a cost-effective price; (2) overcoming customer reluctance in switching from 
gamma to x-ray radiation; and (3) securing customer commitments in the form of financial backing.162  
By the fall of 2014, Synergy was successful in securing non-binding “letters of interest” from a 
number of large customers.163  Synergy, however, was unable to secure any financial backing in the 
form of “take-or-pay contracts,” which seemed necessary if the plan were to ultimately be 
approved.164  
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157 Steris, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 967.  
158 Id. at 962.  
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160 Id. at 964.  
161 Id. at 968.  
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163 Steris, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 968. 
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United States would take up a significant portion of Synergy’s budget, thus forcing it to forgo other investment 
opportunities).  
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In October of 2014, Steris publically announced its plans to merge with Synergy.165  Despite 
this development, Synergy’s x-ray plan continued “unabated” for a three-month period following the 
announcement. 166   During this time, Synergy expressed optimism regarding the plan in a few 
statements which were made public. 167   Specifically, Synergy announced that one of its major 
customers secured “FDA approval of a Class III medical device . . . paving the way for further 
conversions,” and that an exclusive agreement with a manufacturer of x-ray equipment would allow 
it “to get started with x-ray in the U.S.”168  Synergy’s failure in securing customer commitments via 
take-or-pay contracts continued, however, and in February of 2015, Synergy informed the FTC that 
it was cancelling its x-ray plans due to this financial shortcoming.169   
B. Arguments and Ruling 
The FTC argued that the merger should be barred under the actual potential competition 
theory—insisting that but for the transaction, Synergy, a United Kingdom-based company, would not 
have discontinued its plan to compete directly for customers with Steris by introducing 
commercialized x-ray sterilization services to the United States.170  The FTC contended that the 
merger barred future procompetitive benefits that would have resulted when Synergy entered the US 
market—an event that the agency said was likely to occur but for the merger.171  
The district court denied the FTC’s motion for preliminary injunction, finding that the FTC 
“failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [the FTC] is likely to succeed on the merits 
in its upcoming administrative trial.”172  Crucially, the FTC did not employ the perceived potential 
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competition doctrine in arguing that the merger should be unlawful, but brought the case under only 
the theory of actual potential competition.173  Thus, after preliminary hearings, the court directed the 
parties to focus on one issue under the actual competition theory, that is, “whether, absent the 
acquisition, the evidence shows that Synergy probably would have entered the U.S. contract 
sterilization market by building one or more x-ray facilities within a reasonable period of time.”174  
In addition to noting the difficulties companies would have in switching from gamma to x-
ray sterilization,175 the driving factors behind the court’s ruling were (1) Synergy’s failure to secure 
financial commitments from customers, and (2) its inability to lower capital costs involved with the 
project.176  Thus, the district court concluded that future competition between the two firms was 
unlikely, based largely on the fact that the FTC failed to show that Synergy’s plan was financially 
feasible and capable of being implemented in the near future.177  
VI. ANALYSIS  
A. The Court’s Decision 
The court viewed many of the same factors in its analysis that the Supreme Court applied in 
Marine Bancorporation, specifically, when deciding whether Synergy was likely to enter the US 
market. 178   The Steris court focused on objective criteria and emphasized Synergy’s financial 
positioning in deciding whether it had “the available feasible means” of entry.179  Despite finding 
against the government, the court seemed to apply a lower standard under the actual potential 
competition theory by requiring only that the FTC show that Synergy “probably would have 
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entered.”180  Thus, the court’s ruling may suggest that although it applied a lenient standard, it still 
used a heightened test.181  Again, this is evident in the court’s focus on objective evidence regarding 
Synergy’s financial shortcomings, rather than subjective evidence such as Synergy’s public 
announcements concerning its equipment manufacturing agreement and customer interest.182  
The court relied heavily on the FTC in ultimately determining to analyze only the actual 
potential competition doctrine.183  Neither the court’s opinion nor supplementary documents extend 
any explanation for why the FTC chose not to bring the claim on perceived potential competition 
grounds.184  
B. Analyzing the FTC’s Strategy  
The FTC decided not to bring the perceived potential competition doctrine for reasons not 
stated in the opinion.185  Therefore, it remains unclear why the agency did not attempt to also argue 
that the merger should be barred because of the removal of present procompetitive effects Synergy 
had on the US market.  Instead, the FTC chose to argue under the actual potential competition 
theory.186 This ultimately forced the FTC to argue that Synergy was likely to enter the US market—
a burden that it was unable to overcome.  Before scrutinizing the FTC for not bringing the perceived 
potential competition theory, it is important to analyze the framework the FTC uses to decide under 
which theories to pursue the claims.  
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1. Was the FTC Justified in Bringing the Claim?  
The 1984 Merger Guidelines proscribes the framework agencies should follow when 
determining whether to bring a claim, as well as what theories they should proffer. 187   When 
determining whether to bring a claim, the Merger Guidelines employ a “single structural analysis” 
when gauging mergers that present either type of harm.188  This analysis considers a list of objective 
factors which the agencies use to evaluate the harmful effects a specific merger may present, and if 
they are severe enough to justify a challenge to the merger. 189   These factors include: market 
concentration, conditions of entry, the acquired firm’s entry advantage, the market share of the 
acquiring firm, and efficiencies.190  
When the analysis of those factors are taken together, the Merger Guidelines simplify their 
approach into three requirements: (1) the target market must be concentrated;191 (2) entry into the 
target market must not be “generally easy;” 192  and (3) the potential entrant must be uniquely 
advantaged to enter the target market.193  
That being said, the FTC had sound reason to bring a Section 7 claim.  The US market for 
contract sterilization services was essentially controlled by two firms: Steris and Sterigenics, who 
together controlled an overwhelming percentage of the market.194  Thus, the first element (target 
market concertation) within the FTC’s structural analysis is met without question.  Since the FTC 
ultimately did bring the claim, it is presumptively sound to state that it believed elements two (entry 
barriers) and three (unique advantages to entry) were attainable as well—the contract sterilization 
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certainly contained high entry barriers, and it can easily be argued that Synergy was uniquely 
positioned to enter the target market relative to other companies.   
2. Should the FTC Have Brought a Perceived Potential 
Competition Claim?  
After deciding to ultimately bring a claim, the Merger Guidelines then advise the agencies as 
to which theory under the potential competition doctrine are most likely implicated.195  Specifically, 
the Merger Guidelines recognize that both the actual and perceived potential competition theories 
serve a distinct functions, which become implicated based on the positioning of the firms and the 
nature of their markets.196   In describing the relationship between the two theories, the 1984 Merger 
Guidelines state:  
If it were always profit-maximizing for incumbent firms to set price in such a way 
that all entry was deterred and if information and coordination were sufficient to 
implement this strategy, harm to perceived potential competition would be the only 
competitive problem to address.  In practice however, actual potential competition 
has independent importance.  Firms already in the market may not find it optimal 
to set price low enough to deter all entry; moreover, those firms may misjudge the 
entry advantages of a particular firm and, therefore, the price necessary to deter its 
entry.197  
 
Thus, the Guidelines state that present procompetitive effects via lower prices are not always present 
due to the misconstrued perceptions of incumbent firms.198  This fact, according to the FTC, gives 
the actual potential competition theory separate and distinct importance.199  
Given this section of the Guidelines, it is foreseeable that the FTC believed Steris and 
Sterigenics had misconstrued perceptions of Synergy as a potential competitor, or that they just 
simply did not “find it optimal to set prices low enough to deter new entry.”200  In other words, the 
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agency may have not have argued under the perceived potential competition doctrine because it did 
not have sufficient data that showed Synergy’s position on the edge of the market had a present 
procompetitive effect on the US sterilization market.  
 Although the court’s opinion does not outline the conditions of the US sterilization market, 
evidence does show that Synergy’s customers were interested in the idea of x-ray sterilization.201  
This could lead to the conclusion that prices in the market were high to begin with.202  The stronghold 
that the incumbent firms had on the market, however, along with their ability to continually raise 
prices, should have been enough to bar the merger—that is, if the FTC were to balance the other 
factors.  
3. Should the FTC Have Argued under the Perceived Potential 
Competition Theory?  
Overall, the strategy of bringing only one potential competition claim is inconsistent with the 
fact that agencies often employ both the actual and perceived potential competition theories when 
litigating potential competition cases.203  In fact, courts have considered instances where only one 
theory is addressed to be somewhat unusual.204  Additionally, the Supreme Court has taken the 
initiative multiple times in cases where only one theory was alleged, and have remanded lower court 
rulings for further findings under the perceived potential competition theory.205 
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The evidentiary incentives for agencies to bring a claim under both theories are substantial 
since it may permit a wider range of evidence—specifically, that which concerns both the future and 
present effects that a given merger has on the target market. 206   Thus, if the FTC litigated the 
perceived potential competition claim, it would have been able to probe into the subjective evidence 
of firms in the US market to see whether the market perceived Synergy as a likely entrant, and further, 
if this perception had any present procompetitive effect on the US market.  Based on the holdings in 
Procter, Falstaff, and Penn-Olin, the district court in Steris could have, and arguably should have 
considered whether Synergy exerted any considerable influence on the wings of the US market. These 
non-binding guidelines, however, have since served as a replacement for judicial discretion—giving 
administrative agencies a position of dominance when asserting guideline-based arguments in federal 
courts.207  
C. Could the FTC Have Succeeded under the Perceived Potential Competition Theory?  
An analysis of the Steris facts using the original test given by El Paso,208 would likely lead to 
the conclusion that the merger would have been barred.  Again, the Supreme Court in El Paso held 
that Pacific Northwest had a procompetitive impact on competition in the California market because 
they were on the “wings” of that market, notwithstanding the fact that Pacific Northwest never entered 
the California market, nor was it able show that it was likely to enter in the future.209  Synergy was 
similar to Pacific Northwest in many respects.  Like Pacific Northwest, Synergy had financial 
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shortcomings and other barriers which precluded it from immediately entering the market. 210 
However, the Ohio court did not take these factors into account since the merger was viewed under 
the more stringent actual potential competition theory.  
The Court’s decision in Penn-Olin also addressed a multitude of factors that were not given 
consideration in the Steris case due to the district court’s failure to apply the perceived potential 
competition doctrine.211  Although the Court in Penn Olin did not extend a preference of any one 
factor over the other, its description of the type of firm that raises antitrust concerns under the 
perceived potential competition theory seems to resemble a company similar to Synergy.  
Specifically, the Court in Penn-Olin stated, “the existence of an aggressive, well-equipped and well 
financed corporation engaged in the same or related lines of commerce waiting anxiously to enter an 
oligopolistic market would be substantial incentive to competition which cannot be 
underestimated.”212  
The only shortcoming that the Ohio court may have found with this description concerns the 
court’s finding that Synergy’s was unable to secure customer commitments and ultimately lower its 
capital costs.213   But the perceived potential competition doctrine under earlier Supreme Court 
precedent did not solely rely on whether the firm had the actual financial capability to enter.214  
Synergy was also by no means a struggling firm which should not be considered “well-financed.”215  
Synergy had a considerable budget of $40 million for investment purposes, 216 while being situated 
as the third-largest firm in their market.217  The finding that Synergy may have not been able to 
implement a complicated strategy within a short amount of time should not discredit the fact that it 
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is well-financed (being the third largest company and worth over $500,000,000), aggressive 
(evidenced by the fact that Steeves even entertained this plan, and coupled with the fact that he 
purchased Daniken to make it feasible), engaged in a similar market (contract sterilization services), 
and in an oligopolistic market (competition with Steris and Sterigenics in US market).218  Thus, the 
FTC under the rationale proffered by Penn-Olin, could have—at a minimum— pursued a compelling 
argument that Synergy was a perceived potential entrant.   
In further applying the factors that the Court found relevant, in Penn-Olin, for gauging the 
precise competitive harm, the nature of the market certainly favors the FTC’s had it employed the 
perceived potential competition argument.  The entire contract sterilization market was essentially 
controlled by three companies: Steris, Sterigenics, and Synergy.219  Thus, the anticompetitive harm 
that results from this merger includes, that which the Court considered in Procter, in that new entrants 
will be dissuaded from competing in the US market now that an already concentrated market has 
become even more concentrated because of the merger between Steris and Synergy.220  
In Falstaff, the Court alluded to the notion that the public announcements of interest exerted 
by the acquiring firm made it likely that firms in the target market were expecting their entry, thus 
changing their behavior in the market.221  In Steris, it was easily foreseeable that the plan to enter the 
US market instituted by Synergy could have influenced Steris’ and Sterigenics’ market behavior in 
the US.  Numerous firms expressed interest in the plan, and Synergy advertised this plan to a large 
audience while trying to gain customer commitments.222  Thus, it seems as if subjective evidence 
regarding firm perceptions in the US market would have strongly favored the FTC, that is, if the FTC 
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gave itself the chance to argue that Synergy was seen as a perceived potential entrant by firms in the 
US market.  
Whether the Court would have found the presence of a fringe effect is unknown.  This would 
depend on (1) the type of evidence that is revealed in discovery, and (2) whether the Court gives more 
weight to objective or subjective evidence.  Under the Marine Bancorporation standard, objective 
evidence carried the day. 223   The Court in Marine Bancorporation used an objective standard 
regarding what a “rational banker” with perfect information believed.224  It ultimately came to the 
conclusion that there was no present competitive effect since the rational banker most likely knew of 
the barriers to entry, and therefore wouldn’t perceive the firm as a potential entrant after considering 
such.225  In Steris, there were also numerous entry barriers: financing the project, customers gaining 
FDA approval, getting customers to switch from gamma, and, most crucially, hoping that the 
equipment manufacturers develop a machine that can support the x-ray radiation.226  Thus, if the 
Court applied the Marine Bancorporation test to a tee, Steris would most likely not be found to have 
a fringe effect on the market, since the prospects of effectuating its plan were ultimately slim, and 
“rational” firms in the sterilization market would be assumed to be aware of all of this information.  
An objective test, however, is not always applied, and it is certainly foreseeable based on lower court 
rulings that the district court could have used a subjective standard.   
If there were some showing of subjective evidence that could have revealed that Synergy did, 
in fact, have an effect on the target market, then subjective evidence could have enabled the court to 
overlook the objective evidence of Synergy’s financial capabilities.  Further, if the court applied a 
standard that assumed fringe effect, Synergy would not have to worry about this element altogether.227 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The court’s decision in Steris has broad implications for the legal community.  On its face, 
the Steris decision exemplifies how some of the largest firms in extremely concentrated industries 
can avoid antitrust enforcement. Specifically, the Steris case shows how the Supreme Court’s failure 
to use a subjective test under the perceived potential competition doctrine, like the Second Circuit’s, 
has possibly influenced enforcement agencies to not bring their case under the theory at all. This 
phenomenon is not only historically unusual, but also concerning for antitrust agencies who may feel 
compelled to now bring cases under the more stringent actual potential competition theory. If a trend 
away from concentration is what antitrust law and their enforcement agencies most desire, then a 
change in the guidelines should correct for Marine Bancorporation’s evidentiary hurdles under the 
potential competition doctrine.  
 
                                                 
small number of other potential entrants, the feasibility of unilateral entry by Phillips, and the concentrated nature of the 
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